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Informational signals play an important role in Finance. We analyze influential 
recommendations changes in the US between 1993 and 2012 which accounts for 19% of 
the overall.  We find that they depend on the magnitude of the recommendation change, 
concurrent earnings, and higher firm institutional ownership.  Using this to predict 
influential recommendation in an out of sample exercise, we construct a long-short 
portfolio that buys positive and sells negative influential recommendation changes.  We 
find that this strategy yields a net annualized abnormal return of 26%, an annualized Sharpe 
ratio of 1.23, and an annualized certainty-equivalent of 27% between 1999 and 2012, which 
compares well to an annualized Sharpe Ratio of 0.40 and an annualized certainty-equivalent 
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Every so often, market observers point significant share-price reaction to analyst 
recommendation changes. On September 1st 2009 Todd Bault, from Bernstein, issued a 
recommendation change (downgrade) warning investors to the fact that AIG’s share could be 
worthless. Soon the share price fell approximately by 11%1. The shares of Suedzucker AG fell 
12%2 and trading volumes exceeded the previous three-month daily average3, on September 
3rd 2013, after the downgrade by Exane BNP Paribas, who predicts the end of regulated 
European sugar market. Nevertheless, most studies find that, on average, recommendation 
revisions do not generate an economically meaningful reaction after accounting for firm 
specific news, such as earnings announcements (Altinkilic and Hansen 2009; Chen, Francis, 
and Schipper 2005). However, the focus of these studies is on the average effect of stock 
recommendations, and foregoes recommendations that actually had an influential impact on 
the firm. In contrast, this study focuses on influential recommendation changes. We analyze 
their determinants and use this information to construct a portfolio allocation exercise. We 
find that a long-short portfolio conditioned on predicted influential recommendations 
between 1999 and 2012 has an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.23 and an annualized certainty-
equivalent (CEQ) of 27.4%. In contrast, the CRSP equally-weighted index has an annualized 
Sharpe ratio of 0.40 and a CEQ of 6.24%. 
There is evidence that, during the period between 1965 and 1989, trading strategies 
long on past winners and short on past losers stocks realize significant abnormal returns 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). They show that this is not due to systematic risk nor attributed 
to delayed stock price reactions to common factors. Nevertheless, there is evidence that firm-
specific information causes the delay in price reaction. Therefore, analyst recommendations, 
                                                 
1  Tibken, Shara. The Wall Street Journal. November 30, 2009. http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2009/11/30/aig-
shares-fall-as-bernstein-cuts-price-target/ 
2
  Morgan, Jonathan. Bloomberg. September 3, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-03/german-
stocks-decline-as-thyssenkrupp-suedzucker-retreat.html 
3 Zha, Weixin. Bloomberg Businessweek. September 3, 2013. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-09-
03/suedzucker-falls-as-end-to-eu-subsidies-beckons-frankfurt-mover 
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which are firm-specific, should be able to provide some return to investors. According to 
Womack (1996), recommendation changes to positive (negative) categories generate positive 
(negative) excess returns in the direction of the analyst’s forecast predominantly during the 
period of one month (six months). Barber et al. (2001) find that an investment strategy based 
on average analyst recommendations, long on the buy recommendations and short on the sell 
recommendations, delivers positive returns. As a result we create three investment approaches 
based on (i) recommendation level consensus, (ii) recommendation change consensus, and (iii) 
buying positive and selling negative recommendation changes, as the recommendation is 
announced. Cvitanić et al. (2006) propose a dynamic portfolio allocation methodology with 
parameter uncertainty. They find that by using analysts’ recommendations as a parameter in 
their model, investors are able to produce significant utility gains, compared to a naïve strategy 
that goes long on buy recommendations and short on sell recommendations. We benchmark 
these strategies to the naïve strategy (1/N) proposed by DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal 
(2009), as they find that other portfolio allocation strategies are not necessarily better in terms 
of Sharpe ratio and CEQ. 
Loh and Stulz (2011) find that some analyst recommendation changes cause significant 
alterations in firm’s value, leading to large returns and turnover. They find that approximately 
11.7% of the recommendation changes analyzed are influential, which they define as an 
analyst recommendation change that has a recognizable impact at the firm level. Therefore, we 
adapt the three strategies mentioned above to be conditional on influential recommendation 
changes. Our results show that the percentage of influential recommendations is actually 
greater, 19.4% for our sample. Further, they investigate what makes a recommendation change 
more probable to be influential. They find that analysts with larger leader-follower ratios and 
more accurate forecasts are more likely to be influential. Moreover, influential 
recommendation changes are associated with small, growth, high institutional ownership, and 
low analyst activity firms. Additionally, they find evidence that recommendation changes have 
become more influential since the introduction of the Fair Disclosure Regulation in 
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September 2002 by National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). In our results we find 
stronger evidence, which supports that after the implementation of the Fair Disclosure 
Regulation analyst recommendations have a stronger impact. As we find a greater percentage 
of influential recommendation changes between 2003 and 2012, compared to the 
recommendation change during 1993 and 2002. 
At a first stage, we analyze what the characteristics of influential recommendation 
changes are. In previous literature it is found that the timing of recommendation changes 
relative to earnings announcements affects the recommendations impact on stock prices 
(Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004). Further, there is evidence that more accurate earnings forecasts 
facilitate analysts to issue more lucrative stock recommendations (Loh and Mian, 2006). These 
analysts earn considerably greater annual returns than those with poorer forecasts. However, 
we do not find that influential recommendation changes are issued by analysts who previously 
issued more accurate forecasts. Asquith, Au and Mikhail (2005) prove that the content of 
analyst reports when issuing a recommendation change also has an impact. Therefore, we 
expect that influential recommendations are accompanied by new earnings forecasts as these 
include more content. Jagadeesh and Kim (2010) examine whether analysts herd around the 
consensus when they make a new recommendation and find that the market reaction to 
analysts’ recommendation revisions is stronger when the revised recommendations move away 
from the prior consensus. The herding effect is larger for downgrades than for upgrades. 
Consequently, we anticipate that influential recommendations deviate from the consensus and 
find that this is the case. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology applied. Section 3 discusses the results of influential recommendation changes. 






The stock recommendations sample is extracted from the Thomson Financial’s Institutional 
Brokers Estimate (I/B/E/S) U.S Detail File. The sample is built starting from I/B/E/S 
ratings issued by individual analysts from September 1993 to December 2012, with ratings 
ranging from 1 (strong buy) to 5 (sell). We use an inverted ratings scale, as in Loh and Stulz 
(2011) (e.g., strong buy now denoted by 5). 
The emphasis is on recommendation revisions and not levels, because previous research has 
found that recommendation changes contain more information (e.g., Jegadeesh and Kim, 
2010). The recommendation change, rec_chg, is computed as the difference between the 
current rating and the previous outstanding rating by the same analyst. Rating are coded as 5 
(strong buy) to 1 (sell), and the rating changes level lies between -4 and +4. We use Ljungqvist, 
Malloy and Marston (2009) definition that the rating has to have been confirmed by the 
analyst in the last twelve months and has not been stopped by the broker, for outstanding 
rating. Analysts coded as anonymous by I/B/E/S are removed as it is not possible to track 
their recommendation revisions. Also, companies that have less than five recommendations 
during the whole sample period and companies that have less than two years of stock price 
data in the CRSP are removed. This reduces the number of companies to a total of 2,700 
followed by 7,553 analysts. On average, we have recommendation changes for 991 
companies/year. In 1993 we start with 107 firms, as the I/B/E/S recommendation sample 
only starts during the 4th quarter of 1993. In 1997, we have the most companies in a year, 
1,227. The sample of recommendation changes contains a total of 116,028 recommendation 
changes and almost 99% of these recommendation changes lay within the range of -2 to +2. 
In Table I the transition probabilities of the recommendation changes are plotted. We observe 
that recommendations are mainly in optimistic levels and one can read that prior hold ratings 
are more often upgraded, while the non-hold are revised to hold ratings. 
We use the Recommendations Summary Statistics file from I/B/E/S to obtain the 
recommendation consensus. To estimate the analyst’s forecast accuracy we get the one year 
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earnings forecast (FY1) and actual earnings for the forecasted year from detailed earnings 
forecast file from I/B/E/S. We also retrieve the target price data from the I/B/E/S. Each 
target price specifies the analyst’s opinion as to the stock price in the near future, which can 
range from a 6 months to 18 months’ time horizon. We compute the target price expected 
return (TPER) as the return of the target price over the stock price at the day of the target 
price announcement. We end up with a total of 312,679 target price observations between 
January 1999 and December 2012. 
From the CRSP, we obtain stock prices and dividends to compute ex dividend returns. 
We use the stock price and shares outstanding to compute the market capitalization. We 
calculate the daily turnover using the volume and shares outstanding. The book-to-market 
ratio is computed using the book value retrieved from COMPUSTAT and the market 
capitalization. The institutional ownership percentage is extracted from the Thomson Reuters 
stock ownership file. Finally, we extract the daily and monthly Fama-French factors and 
momentum factor from the Kenneth R. French database4. 
 
3. Influential recommendation changes 
 
We follow Loh and Stulz (2011) to compute influential analyst recommendation revisions, and 
use two methods to understand how the recommendation change is reflected on the firm’s 
stock return. The first method is based on the return impact of the firm and is computed 
using the cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return (CAR) with a two-day time window 
     ∏ (1    )
1
   - ∏ (1     
    )1    (1) 
where Rit is the raw return of firm i on day t, and t = 0 is the day of recommendation 
announcement, unless the announcement occurs between 4:30 pm and 11:59 pm, then t = 0 is 
the next trading day.     
     is the return on a benchmark portfolio with the same size, book-
to-market, and momentum characteristics as firm i (Daniel et al., 1997). The price momentum 
is computed monthly as the one year stock return. The composition of these portfolios is 
                                                 
4 Kenneth R. French database: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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estimated on a monthly basis. A recommendation change is influential if simultaneously the 
CAR is in the same direction as the recommendation change and if the following inequality 
holds: 
 |    |       √      (2) 
where    , the idiosyncratic volatility of firm i, is the standard deviation of the residuals from a 
FF model using daily observations from the past three months that starts three months prior 
(t –69) and ends six days before the recommendation announcement (t –6). 
The second method looks at how the stock turnover of the firm is affected by the 
recommendation revision. Llorente et al. (2002) find evidence that volume contains directional 
information about future price movements. Specifically, informed trading shows greater return 
continuation, while the reverse is true for stocks with low-informed trading. Therefore, we are 
interested in stock turnover to understand whether analyst recommendations are a hedging or 
speculating motive for investors. The cumulative abnormal turnover is computed as 
     ∑        
1
    (3) 
and following Llorente et al. (2002), abnormal turnover is 
        log          - log         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (4) 
where log          ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average of daily log turnover of the past three months, and 
log            log(          .        ) . A recommendation is influential in terms of 
cumulative abnormal turnover (CAT) if the following inequality holds: 
           √           (5) 
where          is the standard deviation of the stocks abnormal turnover in the past three 
months, which starts three months prior (t –69) and ends six days before the recommendation 
announcement (t –6). 
To understand the predictive power of recommendation characteristics for influential 
recommendation changes we use a probability unit link function, also known as Probit. 
    {
1 if recommendation   is influential
  otherwise
 (6) (7) 
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where    is characteristic i of the recommendation (e.g., recommendation level, analyst 
experience, book-to-market,…).     ,    ,…,   are assumed to be independent with: 
   (     1    )   (   ) (7)  
where Pr is the probability,   is the cumulative standard Normal distribution function, and the 
parameters β are estimated using a maximum-likelihood model. To determine the incremental 
predictability of a characteristic to forecast an influential recommendation change, we look at 
the marginal effect and not at the coefficient obtained from the Probit estimate. The Marginal 
effect shows us by how much the probability changes by changing one unit of   . From this 
we can then infer the incremental predictability of an influential recommendation change of 
characteristic Xi. 
Table II reports the descriptive statistics of CARs for our sample of recommendation 
changes, grouped by the recommendation change categories from -4 to +4. All positive 
(negative) rating changes categories have positive (negative) CAR means and medians. This 
sample we filter into three other samples. This allows us to analyze differences between all 
recommendation change and only influential recommendation change and also how the 
sample changed as of 2007 with the start of the financial crisis. For negative revisions the 25th 
and 1st percentiles have larger negative returns opposed to the positive ones. The CARs are 
not normal distributed (see KS-test results in Table II) and the company specific news-
recommendations and outliers have a strong impact on the means. For the period between 
2007 and 2012, we do not observe any significant change. 
Filtering the CAR means for influential recommendation changes we notice that they 
have changed and are more distant from zero but still follow the same pattern, compared to 
the whole sample. Regarding the 1st percentile for the positive (negative) recommendation 
change categories the CARs are all above (below) zero. These results describe how the tails of 
the non-filtered results look like and show the statistical and economic significance of 
influential recommendations. Therefore investors, who are able to successfully identify these 
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recommendations changes when they are issued, are able to profit from significant returns. 
Filtering the influential sample for the period between 2007 and 2012, we still find similar 
results compared to the whole period. 
Figure 1 plots the two-day CAR histogram of recommendation changes for zero-point 
and one point magnitude changes, as these categories include about 75% of the total 
recommendation changes. The top chart plots the histogram for CARs of the no 
recommendation change category, which mostly fall close to zero. The charts below plot the 
histograms for the one point downgrade and upgrade, which are negatively and positively 
skewed respectively. This shows that the direction of the recommendation change indicates 
the sign of the return obtained during the first two days after issuing the recommendation. 
We find that 19.4% of the recommendation changes for the whole sample are 
influential in terms of abnormal return and 25.9% in abnormal turnover. While only 10.6% of 
the recommendation changes are influential on both. In contrast, Loh and Stulz (2011) find 
that 11.7% and 12.8% of recommendation revisions are influential in terms of abnormal 
return and turnover respectively. Further, we see that our results are higher between 2003 and 
2012 (21.9% and 28.8%) but lower before 2003 (16.5% and 22.5%), which indicates that 
Reg_FD act had a positive impact on analyst recommendations. The fact that percentage of 
influential recommendation changes in CAT is higher than in CAR, shows that 
recommendations have a stronger impact on volume rather than on price. According to 
Llorent et al. (2002), stocks associated with informed trading, which had high-volume days, 
show return momentum. Meaning that trades performed on the basis of analyst 
recommendation should be seen as informed and therefore the influential recommendation 
changes in CAT are very helpful for investors as they have predictive power about the future 
stock price movement.   
In Table III, we observe that influential recommendations revisions are less accurate 
than non-influential recommendation revisions, as the 1st quintile represents the most accurate 
analysts. This finding is inconsistent with Loh and Mian (2006) result that more accurate 
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earnings forecasts generate greater annual returns. From Table IV, forecast accuracy does not 
provide much incremental predictability in identifying influential recommendation revisions. 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) analyze if analyst have a tendency to take similar actions, 
recommendations, around the same time. This behavioral bias is also known as “herding”.  To 
understand whether an analyst is not affected by this bias, meaning that he is away from the 
consensus, we test if the deviation of a new recommendation is greater than the prior absolute 
deviation of the recommendation consensus, as suggested by Loh and Stulz (2011). We find 
that, on average, influential recommendation changes are further away from the consensus. In 
line with Jegadeesh and Kim (2010), we find that recommendation changes that are further 
away from the consensus are more likely to be influential (Table IV). In alignment with 
Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997), we find that analysts, who issue influential 
recommendation changes, tend to have more experience but do not necessarily increase the 
predictive power of an influential recommendation. 
Kecskes, Michaely and Womack (2012) find that recommendations accompanied by 
earnings forecast revisions are more profitable and have larger price reactions. In line with 
their findings we observe in Table III that more than 60% of the influential recommendations 
were issued by analysts, who issued an earnings forecast between a three-day window around 
the recommendation announcement. Moreover, it also significantly increases the predictability 
of an influential recommendation (Table IV). 
Conversely, Table IV shows that analysts who have been previously influential for any 
of the stocks they follow are more likely to produce an influential recommendation. But 
analysts, who issue a recommendation for a firm for which they have been influential before, 
have less probability of issuing an influential recommendation change.  
In line with Stickel (1995), who finds that the stock-price reaction for smaller firms is 
greater than for larger ones, the difference in size does not change significantly for influential 
recommendations (Table III). Nevertheless, Table IV shows that recommendation changes 
for large firms have a negative marginal effect, meaning that small firms increase the 
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predictability of an influential recommendation change. In terms of book-to-market we can 
observe, both in Table III and IV, that growth firms have an incremental impact on the 
predictability of an influential recommendation change, opposed to value firms. Comparing 
recommendation changes on firms related to the financial and insurance sector, we see that 
these are less likely to be influential. We find that influential recommendations are associated 
with higher institutional ownership firms. This is consistent with Kelsey et al. (2007) findings 
that analysts, who follow firms with higher institutional ownership, issue more accurate 
earnings forecast and also react faster to new information. 
In Table IV, we observe that recommendation level does not increase the probability 
of issuing an influential recommendation change. An explanation for this is related to the fact 
that the recommendation level itself does not contain information about the past performance 
relative to the future expectations of the stock. In line with Asquith, Au and Mikhail (2005) 
finding that the content of recommendation has an impact, as recommendation with larger 
magnitudes should include more new information. The absolute recommendation change 
value shows a strong impact on the likelihood of issuing an influential recommendation 
change. Meaning that when a recommendation moves from sell (strong buy) to strong buy 
(sell), equal to a four-point magnitude upgrade (downgrade), a recommendation change is 
more likely to be influential (the bottom chart in Figure 2 plots the transition probabilities of 
the influential recommendation changes). Table III also shows that positive recommendation 
changes, Upgrade Dummy, are more likely to be influential. One possible reason for this is 
related to short selling constraints, causing negative recommendation changes to react slower. 
Consistent with Loh and Stulz (2011) results, we find evidence that the Regulation Fair 
Disclosure act from 2000, Reg FD, has a significant marginal effect in the predictability of an 
influential recommendation. This shows that through the introduction of Reg FD investors 
started to give more attention to analyst recommendations. 
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We also study how the characteristics have changed through time.5 Figure 3 plots the 
estimates from a Probit model, using a 5-year monthly rolling window and an initial estimation 
window from 1994 to 1998, as we want to use results for an out of sample strategy. Panel A 
shows how the Away_from_consensus, Influential before any stock and Influential before same stock 
initially have an incremental effect on the predictability of an influential recommendation. 
However, after periods of financial bursts these characteristics lose predictive power. Looking 
at the Absolute value of recommendation change, in Panel B, we observe that this has been one of the 
variables with most incremental predictability for an influential recommendation. In this chart 
we also see that the Upgrade Dummy initially did not have much of an impact, however, 
through time it has gained more significance. One of the most volatile variables is the Financial 
Dummy, which through most of the period seems to not have had much incremental 
predictability for influential recommendation changes. Nevertheless, after the financial crisis 
we observe that the marginal effect has become negative, but slowly reverted back to no 
significant marginal effect. Panel C shows the evolution of one of the most important 
variables Concurrent earnings forecast, which increased in power with the boom after the dot-com 
bubble burst but reverted back to its initial level after the financial crisis. The third variable 
which shows most significance is Institutional ownership that remained mostly constant through 
time (Panel D). Price momentum had a negative marginal effect at the start of the estimation, 
reaching its lowest during the dot-com crisis. But since then it has been becoming non-
significant, only during the financial crisis it is possible to observe a short inversion in this 
trend. This leads to the conclusion that the three characteristics that have the most 
incremental predictability of an influential recommendation change are Absolute value of 
recommendation change, Concurrent earnings forecast, and Institutional ownership. This shows that 
investors act more to positive recommendations, especially the ones that come from analyst 
who simultaneously provide new content by issuing new earnings forecasts. Moreover, the 
                                                 
5 The Reg FD characteristic is excluded for this analysis, as for the initial rolling window estimates the dummy 
variable is always equal to zero, and later it is always equal to one. 
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fact that institutional ownership is also a key characteristic shows that institutional investors are 
more concerned with the opinion of sell-side analysts. 
4. Investment strategies 
 
 Previous literature has shown that by using analyst recommendations for investment 
strategies, one is able to create significant alphas. Barber et al. (2001) find that an investment 
strategy based on average recommendations of analysts, long (short) on the buy (sell) 
recommendations, yields annualized returns of 18.8% (5.8%) between 1986 and 1996 in the 
US.  Other literature has shown that strategies based on average analyst recommendation 
revisions have more impact than merely on average analyst recommendations. Green (2006) 
finds that a strategy tracking recommendation revisions results in an average two-day return of 
1.0% (1.5%) for upgrades (downgrades) after transaction costs. Barber, Lehavy and Trueman 
(2010) find that a strategy conditioned on recommendation levels (changes) yields an 
annualized abnormal return of 8.8% (9.6%). By creating a new strategy that is conditioned on 
both recommendation levels and changes they achieve an annualized return improvement of 
3.5%. Our objective is to understand which investment strategy based on analyst data can be 
expected to perform well. To do this, we evaluate a range of different long-short investment 
approaches: (i) based on recommendation consensus of the last six months, (ii) based on 
average recommendation changes, and (iii) based on buying analyst recommendation changes 
on the day of the recommendation announcement. We include the results of the long and 
short portfolios in our analysis, so that it is possible to analyze how the two sides affect the 
long-short portfolio. This also allows identifying the best performing strategy for long-only 
constrained investors. We compare each of these three approaches into different kind of 
strategies, one that considers all recommendations and one that is only concerned by 
influential recommendations. According to Brav and Lehavy (   3) analysts’ target price 
contain incremental information as there is a significant market reaction to target price 
revisions. Further, Asquith, Au and Mikhail (2005) find that target price revisions hold new 
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information even in the company of stock recommendation change and earnings revisions. 
Huang, Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (20 9) find that by combining analysts’ target price 
revisions and consensus recommendation, they are able to improve the returns and reduce risk 
exposure, compared to implementing analysts’ target price revisions and consensus 
recommendations portfolios separately. Thus, we also analyze the first two investment 
approaches mentioned above perform, when combined with change in consensus target price. 
We compare our results with the CRSP equally-weighted index (Panel A of Table V). 
Additionally, we construct a 1/N portfolio of our entire sample (Panel B), as it has been found 
that it performs as well as other portfolio allocation strategies in an out of sample analysis 
(DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal, 2009). Stocks, whose share-price is below $5 at the month 
end are excluded from the portfolios for the investment approaches (i) and (ii), while for 
investment approach (iii) we exclude the stock if the price on the recommendation 
announcement date (t=0) is below $ . As D’Avolio (    ) shows that it is hard to borrow 
stocks with a price below $5, and therefore these stocks are not suitable for strategies that 
involve short-selling. 
Using the first baseline investment approach (i) we build two strategies. The first 
strategies uses all recommendations to build the consensus (Panel C), and the second one only 
considers recommendations that were influential (Panel D). We observe that the long-short 
portfolio that is conditioned to influential recommendation changes performs worse, 
annualized Sharpe ratio of -0.09 and CEQ of -1.1%, than its counterparty that includes all 
recommendation, annualized Sharpe ratio of -0.17 and CEQ of 0.2%. Hence, an investor 
following a strategy that is based on consensus recommendation levels can improve his return 
but still have a worse performance when compared to the CRSP equally-weighted index, by 
restricting the consensus to only include recommendations that have been influential. 
For the second investment approach (ii) we similarly build two strategies, where the 
first one includes all recommendation (Panel E) and the second only uses influential 
recommendation changes for the consensus (Panel F). By using a consensus that considers the 
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recommendation change and not the level, we note that the long-short portfolio in Panel E 
improves compared to the portfolio in Panel C that is based on recommendation level, the 
annualized Sharpe ratio increases by 0.20 and the CEQ by 2.0%. However, the long-short 
portfolio in Panel F, which only takes influential recommendation changes into account, has a 
poorer performance compared to its counterparty (Panel E). The annualized Sharpe ratio 
decreases by 0.40 and the CEQ by 2.7%. And also compared to the long-short portfolio (i) 
with all recommendations (Panel D) the annualized Sharpe ratio decreases by 0.28 and the 
CEQ increases by 0.6%. 
Panel G shows how the third investment approach (iii) with all recommendation 
changes performs, while the strategy in Panel H consists only of recommendation changes 
that are predicted to be influential. We use the Absolute value of recommendation change, Concurrent 
earnings forecast, and Institutional ownership characteristics to predict influential recommendation 
changes, as we find these to be the most important in an out of sample analysis. Table V 
shows that the investment approach (iii) yields the best result. The two long-short portfolios 
in Panel G and H have a Sharpe ratio of 0.59 and 1.22 and an annualized CEQ return of 
27.7% and 10.7%. Both of these strategies over-perform compared to our benchmarks, the 
CRSP equally-weighted index has a Sharpe ratio of 0.40 and annualized CEQ of 6.2%, while 
the naïve strategy has a Sharpe ratio of 0.26 and an annualized CEQ of 3.7%. The portfolios 
using the first and second approach have considerably poorer results. A possible reason if 
from consensus being formed with backward looking recommendation levels or changes, 
whose information is already partially incorporated in the market price. Therefore, we find 
that strategies that use influential recommendation changes to form a consensus perform 
worse than their counterparties. 
Last, we consider how changes in TPER consensus can be used in conjunction with 
our stock recommendation strategies. Panel I shows the results for a strategy that is solely 
based on changes in TPER consensus. To construct the long portfolio and the short portfolio 
we rank the changes in TPER consensus into three. The long portfolio includes all stocks that 
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have the highest changes in TPER consensus, while the short portfolio contains all the stocks 
that have the lowest changes in TPER consensus. Our results show that the long portfolio has 
an annualized Sharpe ratio of -0.68 and a CEQ 0.6%, which is similar to the naïve strategy. 
However, both the short and long-short portfolios have a poorer performance compared to 
the naïve strategy but still better than the CRSP equally-weighted index. Finally, we look at 
how changes in TPER recommendation consensus can be combined with recommendation 
consensus, investment approach (i), or recommendation changes consensus, investment 
approach (ii), considering all recommendations and only influential ones. We find that the new 
long portfolios for these two strategy approaches improve, while the results for the short 
portfolios deteriorate. This leads to new long-short portfolios, which have similar results as 
the portfolios that did not consider changes in TPER recommendation consensus and have 
poorer performance compared to the naïve strategy (Panels J, K, L and M of Table V). It is 
worth noticing that the long portfolio in Panel K, which is based on the recommendation 
change consensus investment approach (ii) combined with changes in TPER consensus, is the 
best performing portfolio of all that use changes in TPER consensus. This portfolio has a 
Sharpe ratio of 0.51 and annualized CEQ of 8.7%, which is better than the performance of 
the CRSP equally-weighted index. Similarly to our findings for investment approaches (i) and 
(ii) without considering changes in TPER consensus, we observe that the strategies, which 
form consensus using only influential recommendations, perform worse than their 
counterparties. 
We run the same analysis for a different period of time. The first period starts in 2003. 
We observe that the annualized Sharpe ratio decreases to 1.11, comparable to 0.66 of the 
naïve strategy. While in the second period, which starts in 2008, annualized Sharpe ratio has a 
stronger reduction to 0.62 closer to the one of the naïve strategy, 0.56. During these two 
periods, the CRSP equally-weighted index has a poorer performance compared to both of 
these strategies, a Sharpe ratio of 0.33 and 0.08 for the first sub period and the second sub 
period respectively. 
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It is possible that the results in the third investment approach (iii) that buys 
recommendation changes are driven by the holding period. We change this assumption to one 
quarter (63 trading days). In line with Stickel (1995), we observe a reduction in annualized 
mean returns, more importantly both long portfolios have negative Sharpe ratios. However, 
the long-short portfolios still have positive Sharpe ratios, 0.27 and 0.58 respectively. 
Compared to the CRSP equally-weighted, which has a Sharpe ratio of 0.40, the strategy using 
all recommendation changes becomes unattractive. Therefore, we see that increasing the 
holding period has a negative impact on the strategy’s result, especially for an investor who is 
considering all recommendation changes and is constrained to long-only investments. 
To incorporate trading costs (i.e. bid-ask spread, brokerage commissions, trading 
impact) we estimate the annualized turnover, as in Barber et al. (2001).  For each stock i in 
portfolio p, we calculate at the close of the trading date on t-1 the new fraction of weights of 
the portfolio at the close of the trading date t, assuming that there was no portfolio 
rebalancing (G   ) 
           -           ∑     -          
    - 
   
⁄  (8) 
Secondly, F   , which represents the actual fraction of stock i in portfolio p, on date t 
taking into account any portfolio rebalancing, is subtracted from G   . The turnover for firm i 
at time t is given by 
     ∑ max     -    
    
   
    (9) 
The annual turnover is calculated by multiplying by the number of months (trading 
days) in a year with     . Table V shows that most long-short strategies have an annual 
turnover close to 100%. This means that over a period of one year the portfolio fully rotates. 
As expected, the two long-short portfolios in Panel G and H have significantly higher 
turnover, 479.8% and 412.7% respectively. Using the annual turnover we proxy transaction 
costs by means of the round-trip cost of the bid-ask spread estimated to be 1% [e.g. individual 
investors (Barber and Odean, 2000), and mutual funds (Carhart 1997)]. Looking at Table V we 
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observe that the minimum annual transaction cost would reduce the annualized abnormal 
return of the long-short portfolio, which is based on all recommendations, to 15.4% (4.8% 
reduction), of the long-short portfolio, which acts on predicted influential recommendations, 
to 27.4% (4.1% reduction), and of the naïve strategy to 6.6% (0.6% reduction). This indicates 
that even after transaction costs the long-short portfolio conditioned to predicted influential 
recommendations is still a valuable strategy. 
5. Conclusion 
 
Stock analysts sell themselves to clients as experts since they are able to bring new and 
valuable information to them. The press has reported on several cases where stock analysts 
had a significant impact with their recommendation change on stock returns (e.g. AIG). Most 
literature is concentrated on the average market price reaction of stock recommendation 
changes. Following Loh and Stulz (2011), we find that approximately 20% of the 
recommendation changes are influential in terms of abnormal return. In terms of abnormal 
turnover, which can predict the direction of future stock price movements (Llorente et al., 
2002), 26% of the recommendation changes are influential. The analysts who issue influential 
recommendation changes tend to distance their recommendation from the prior 
recommendation consensus, issue earnings forecasts around the period of the 
recommendation announcement, and have more experience as analysts. Additionally, 
recommendation changes for small and growth firms, with higher institutional ownership, are 
more likely to be influential. If a positive recommendation change is issued, the likelihood of 
an influential recommendation change increases. Moreover, the larger the magnitude of the 
recommendation changes, then more likely it is to be influential, independent of the sign of 
the recommendation change. 
Using the three most predominant characteristics of influential recommendation 
revisions, Absolute recommendation change value, prior Concurrent earnings forecast, and Institutional 
ownership percentage, we construct a long-short portfolio that buys positive recommendation 
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changes and sells negative recommendations changes from 1999 to 2012. This portfolio yields 
a net annualized abnormal return of 27.4% using the four factor model, a Sharpe ratio of 1.22, 
and a CEQ return of 27.7%. Compared to the CRSP equally-weighted index, which has a 
Sharpe Ratio of 0.07 and an annualized CEQ return of 0.7%, during the same period. 
To conclude, we show that some recommendation changes have a greater impact on 
the market and that by creating a strategy based on these characteristics we achieve to 
construct a portfolio that has significantly better performance, compared to other strategies 
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Figure 1 – Histogram of CARs for 0, -1, and +1 recommendation changes 
The blue bars plot the CARs histogram of the distribution for each of the recommendation change level. The red line plots 
the fitted normal distribution for the CARs of each recommendation change level. The sample of recommendation changes is 
from the I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File in the period between 1993 and 2012. Each recommendation change is the difference 
between analyst’s current rating and her prior rating. Analyst initiations or anonymous analysts are excluded. Rating is coded 




Figure 2 – Transition probabilities of recommendation changes 
This chart plots the transition probabilities of recommendation changes, meaning the probability that a prior recommendation 
transits to any of the five rating classifications. The top chart plots the transition probabilities of the whole sample and the 
bottom chart the transition probabilities of influential recommendation changes. The sample of recommendation changes is 
from the I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File in the period between 1993 and 2012. Each recommendation change is the difference 
between analyst’s current rating and her prior rating. Analyst initiations or anonymous analysts are excluded. Rating is coded 





Figure 3 – Marginal effect of influential characteristics based on abnormal return 
Marginal effects from a 5-year rolling window Probit model estimated monthly, starting in 1999, using characteristics of 
influential recommendation as the explanatory variable. The binary dependent variable is 1 if the recommendation is 
influential and 0 otherwise. The marginal effect for continuous (dummy) explanatory variables represents the change in the 
predicted probability the independent variable change by one standard deviation (from 0 to 1). Influential recommendations 
have been defined in two different manners. First, a recommendation change is influential on abnormal returns when 
|    |       √     . Forecast accuracy is the analysts’ prior quintile (lower rank represents greater accuracy). Away from consensus 
is one when the new recommendation has a higher absolute deviation than the absolute deviation of the prior 
recommendation consensus. Absolute analyst experience is the number of quarters an analyst is in the I/B/E/S prior to the 
recommendation and Relative analyst experience is the difference between the Absolute analyst experience and the mean Absolute 
analyst experience of other analysts for the same company. Financial Dummy is one if the recommendation is for a firm in the 
financial and insurance sector. Concurrent earnings forecast is one if the analyst issues an earnings forecast (FY1) in a three-day 
window around the recommendation. 
.  
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Table I – Transition probabilities of recommendation changes 
Reports the transition probabilities of recommendations changes (e.g. in column 5 when the prior recommendation is a sell, it 
has a probability of 8.9% of moving to a strong buy in the next quarter). The sample of recommendation changes is from the 
I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File in the period between 1993 and 2012. Each recommendation change is the difference between 
analyst’s current rating and her prior rating. Analyst initiations or anonymous analysts are excluded. Rating is coded from 5 
(strong buy) to 1 (sell), and the rating changes level lies between -4 and 4.  
Current Recommendation
1 2 3 4 5
(Sell) (Underperform) (Hold) (Buy) (Strong Buy) Total
1 (Sell) 241 194 2,120 166 245 2,966
8.1% 6.5% 71.5% 5.6% 8.3% 100%
2 (Underperform) 239 1,073 3,761 632 139 5,844
4.1% 18.4% 64.4% 10.8% 2.4% 100%
3 (Hold) 2,226 4,193 11,206 14,775 10,852 43,252
5.1% 9.7% 25.9% 34.2% 25.1% 100%
4 (Buy) 226 793 18,397 8,299 8,419 36,134
0.6% 2.2% 50.9% 23.0% 23.3% 100%
5 (Strong Buy) 311 208 13,428 9,060 4,825 27,832
1.1% 0.7% 48.2% 32.6% 17.3% 100%
Total 3,243 6,461 48,912 32,932 24,480 116,028
Prior Recommendation
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Filtered Samples Mean Mode % CAR + Skewness Kurtosis KS test 99% 75% Median 25% 1% # Obs
Recommendation Change = -4
1) Full Sample -6.551 2.620 36.334 -4.77 41.00 0.424 *** 23.01 1.39 -2.335 -9.48 -74.76 311
2) Influential -24.196 -3.445 0.000 1.15 21.57 0.510 *** -2.47 -10.22 -14.848 -28.39 -170.92 87
3) 2007-2012 -10.418 2.620 -4.272 0.95 27.46 0.431 *** 32.62 1.17 -5.502 -12.13 -156.22 105
4) Influential 2007-2012 -27.998 -5.957 0.000 2.50 14.40 0.514 *** -3.44 -10.40 -14.596 -26.57 -201.14 40
Recommendation Change = -3
1) Full Sample -3.779 -0.281 36.636 -1.86 11.62 0.404 *** 27.40 1.69 -1.120 -5.47 -59.70 434
2) Influential -24.110 -8.111 0.000 -1.46 5.03 0.509 *** -2.44 -10.41 -19.990 -29.39 -86.42 83
3) 2007-2012 -4.655 0.512 29.231 -3.17 18.22 0.428 *** 27.47 0.59 -2.110 -5.31 -83.33 65
4) Influential 2007-2012 -22.092 -8.250 0.000 -2.037 6.21 0.510 *** -2.59 -9.90 -14.622 -25.36 -88.38 14
Recommendation Change = -2
1) Full Sample -4.250 -0.044 34.438 -3.56 31.51 0.426 *** 20.73 1.14 -1.602 -6.02 -62.60 16,447
2) Influential -17.915 -3.216 0.000 -3.16 17.72 0.506 *** -2.57 -6.70 -11.363 -20.87 -101.84 4,237
3) 2007-2012 -3.318 0.701 35.232 -4.34 51.54 0.417 *** 26.79 1.44 -1.672 -5.94 -54.73 5,864
4) Influential 2007-2012 -14.842 -2.781 0.000 -4.814 36.24 0.506 *** -2.40 -5.99 -9.373 -16.03 -102.99 1621
Recommendation Change = -1
1) Full Sample -3.661 -0.468 36.429 -3.30 29.45 0.429 *** 18.25 1.39 -1.393 -5.58 -54.29 31,889
2) Influential -17.248 -3.351 0.000 -2.95 17.00 0.506 *** -2.56 -6.72 -11.497 -20.98 -83.52 7,191
3) 2007-2012 -2.619 1.592 37.483 -4.16 55.33 0.419 *** 23.61 1.52 -1.286 -5.09 -40.82 8,892
4) Influential 2007-2012 -13.898 -2.769 0.000 -5.027 43.05 0.506 *** -2.29 -5.85 -9.367 -15.71 -80.35 2110
Recommendation Change = 0
1) Full Sample -0.141 0.334 50.542 -2.62 56.52 0.430 *** 17.03 2.44 0.042 -2.30 -21.02 25,644
2) Influential 9.134 2.617 100.000 4.60 51.09 0.505 *** 39.38 10.92 6.861 4.56 2.08 2,188
3) 2007-2012 0.039 0.405 51.353 -1.42 108.82 0.434 *** 15.84 2.45 0.102 -2.22 -16.01 8,204
4) Influential 2007-2012 8.110 2.219 100.000 7.544 109.58 0.505 *** 33.05 9.76 6.315 4.19 1.90 923
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Table II – Continued 
 
Each panel reports summary statistics for the two-day (0,1) buy-and-hold CAR (in percent) of a recommendation change category. Daily abnormal return is the raw return 
less the daily return of the corresponding DGTW portfolio. The sample of recommendation changes is from the I/B/E/S Detail U.S. File in the period between 1993 and 
2012. Each recommendation change is the difference between analyst’s current rating and her prior rating. Analyst initiations or anonymous analysts are excluded. Rating is 
coded from 5 (strong buy) to 1 (sell), and the rating changes level lies between -4 and 4. KS test is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic testing for the normality of the 
sample distribution where *, **, *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively for the rejection of the null hypothesis of normality.  
Percentiles
Filtered Samples Mean Mode % CAR + Skewness Kurtosis KS test 99% 75% Median 25% 1% # Obs
Recommendation Change = +1
1) Full Sample 2.085 -0.188 63.431 1.27 40.11 0.429 *** 27.57 4.96 1.374 -1.37 -18.94 27,149
2) Influential 11.293 2.893 100.000 5.21 62.81 0.507 *** 44.47 13.85 8.769 5.73 2.57 5,583
3) 2007-2012 1.823 -0.690 62.029 2.18 47.31 0.427 *** 27.18 4.75 1.265 -1.61 -19.95 8,272
4) Influential 2007-2012 10.661 2.847 100.000 6.309 69.86 0.507 *** 41.80 12.82 8.139 5.36 2.35 1895
Recommendation Change = +2
1) Full Sample 2.065 2.655 63.717 -2.94 174.62 0.431 *** 26.14 4.90 1.436 -1.26 -19.30 13,604
2) Influential 10.725 2.783 100.000 6.31 89.58 0.506 *** 39.98 13.15 8.438 5.61 2.38 3,087
3) 2007-2012 2.335 -0.818 64.253 3.21 69.87 0.428 *** 28.58 5.25 1.666 -1.29 -20.38 5,399
4) Influential 2007-2012 10.839 2.524 100.000 7.844 109.36 0.506 *** 41.53 12.97 8.548 5.60 2.29 1430
Recommendation Change = +3
1) Full Sample 1.125 -0.770 54.754 1.17 13.25 0.421 *** 27.26 3.68 0.414 -1.95 -22.66 305
2) Influential 13.742 2.793 100.000 2.16 8.56 0.511 *** 56.08 16.32 11.625 7.09 2.79 40
3) 2007-2012 0.595 -1.071 49.206 1.68 9.99 0.448 *** 29.38 2.31 -0.089 -2.88 -18.26 63
4) Influential 2007-2012 12.582 2.793 100.000 0.801 2.20 0.511 **  30.04 19.12 9.976 4.81 2.79 8
Recommendation Change = +4
1) Full Sample 1.922 3.124 62.449 -2.25 31.08 0.441 *** 20.38 4.85 1.458 -1.25 -17.81 245
2) Influential 9.572 3.948 100.000 0.83 2.85 0.506 *** 24.25 11.68 8.365 5.23 1.60 52
3) 2007-2012 3.140 0.711 64.444 1.06 12.28 0.452 *** 36.02 6.37 1.780 -0.77 -24.87 90
4) Influential 2007-2012 9.775 8.749 100.000 0.582 2.44 0.506 *** 20.18 12.21 9.448 5.27 1.57 24
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Table III – Analyst and firm characteristics around the recommendation event 
Comparison of non-influential recommendation changes with influential ones, influential recommendation changes are defined either on abnormal return or turnover. A 
recommendation change is influential on abnormal returns when |    |       √    . A recommendation change is influential on abnormal turnover when 
          √          . Abnormal turnoveri is log          - log         
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
, where log turnoveri = log(turnoveri + 0.00000255). *, **, *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. Panel A compares analyst characteristics between non-influential recommendation changes versus influential ones. Past Forecast accuracy quintile is the analysts’ 
prior quintile (lower ranks represent greater accuracy). Away from consensus is one when the new recommendation has a higher absolute deviation than the absolute deviation of 
the prior recommendation consensus. Absolute analyst experience is the number of quarters an analyst is in the I/B/E/S prior to the recommendation and Relative analyst 
experience is the Absolute analyst experience minus mean Absolute analyst experience of other analysts for the same company. Concurrent earnings forecast is one if the analyst issues an 
earnings forecast (FY1) in a three-day window around the recommendation. Influential before (any stock) look at whether the analyst issuing the recommendation has previously 
been influential for any stock he follows, while Influential before (same stock) only considers the same stock as for the recommendation the analyst issuing. Panel B compares firm 
characteristics, such as B/M ratio, Size and percentage of shares hold by institutions (Institutional ownership), between non-influential recommendation change and influential 
ones, prior to the recommendation announcement. 
Influential based on firm's
Abnormal return Abnormal turnover
Characteristics Non Influential Influential t -stat Non Influential Influential t -stat
Panel A: Analyst characteristics
Number of recommendation changes 93,480 22,548 85,955 30,073
19.43% 25.92%
Forecast accuracy quintile 2.463 2.488 0.025 *** (6.14) 2.466 2.473 0.007 **  (1.65)
Away from consensus 0.502 0.562 0.060 *** (40.66) 0.503 0.544 0.041 *** (27.61)
Absolute analyst experience (# Qtrs) 18.937 20.878 1.941 *** (42.43) 18.923 20.433 1.510 *** (33.01)
Relative analyst experience 7.626 8.523 0.896 *** (22.79) 7.660 8.201 0.540 *** (13.74)
Concurrent earnings forecast 0.444 0.602 0.158 *** (107.49) 0.438 0.578 0.140 *** (95.62)
Influential before (any stock) 0.708 0.772 0.063 *** (47.99) 0.708 0.757 0.050 *** (37.72)
Influential before (same stock) 0.297 0.348 0.051 *** (37.63) 0.296 0.338 0.042 *** (31.32)
Panel B: Firm characteristics prior to recommendation       
B/M ratio 0.302 0.206 -0.095 *** (-3.58) 0.252 0.294 -0.042 *   (-1.6)
Size ($m) 11053.686 10863.568 -190.118 **  (-2.03) 11001.953 11059.007 57.054      (0.61)
Institutional ownership (%) 61.687 65.770 4.083 *** (52.91) 61.181 66.196 5.015 *** (64.99)
Difference Difference
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Table IV – Characteristics of influential recommendation changes 
 
This table presents Probit models estimates and t-statistics in brackets below the coefficients. The marginal effect for 
continuous (dummy) explanatory variables represents the change in the predicted probability the independent variable 
change by one standard deviation (from 0 to 1). The binary dependent variable is one if the recommendation is 
influential, and zero otherwise. Influential recommendations have been defined in two ways. First, a recommendation 
change is influential on abnormal returns when |    |       √     . Second, a recommendation change is influential on 
abnormal turnover when           √          . Abnormal turnover is log          - log         
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
 where log turnoveri = 
log(turnoveri + 0.00000255). *, **, *** denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Influential before (any 
stock) look at whether the analyst issuing the recommendation has previously been influential for any stock he follows, 
while Influential before (same stock) only considers the same stock as for the recommendation the analyst issuing. Past 
Forecast accuracy quintile is the analysts’ prior quintile (lower ranks represent greater accuracy). Away from consensus is one 
when the new recommendation has a higher absolute deviation than the absolute deviation of the prior recommendation 
consensus. Absolute analyst experience is the number of quarters an analyst is in the I/B/E/S prior to the recommendation 
and Relative analyst experience is the Absolute analyst experience minus mean Absolute analyst experience of other analysts for the 
same company. Financial Dummy is one if the recommendation is for a firm in the financial and insurance sector. 
Concurrent earnings forecast is one if the analyst issues an earnings forecast (FY1) in a three-day window around the 
recommendation. 
Influential based on firm's Influential based on firm's 
Abnormal return Abnormal turnover
Explantory Variable Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect
Influential before (any stock) 0.102 *** 2.711 0.065 *** 2.071
(8.72) (5.99)
Influential before (same stock) 0.042 *** 1.122 0.041 *** 1.307
(4.12) (4.25)
Recommendation level -0.042 *** -1.118 -0.044 *** -1.392
(-7.31) (-8.13)
Absolute value of recommendation change 0.224 *** 5.959 0.185 *** 5.903
(34.61) (30.54)
Upgrade Dummy 0.054 *** 1.440 0.028 **  0.887
(4.53) (2.49)
Reg FD Dummy 0.073 *** 1.949 0.065 *** 2.068
(5.37) (5.08)
Financial Dummy -0.060      -1.592 -0.024      -0.766
(-1.09) (-0.48)
Past forecast accuracy quintile 0.000      0.010 -0.009 *** -0.286
(0.12) (-3.08)
Away from consensus 0.082 *** 2.176 0.047 *** 1.503
(9.28) (5.72)
Absolute analyst experience 0.005 *** 0.124 0.005 *** 0.150
(4.53) (4.86)
Relative analyst experience -0.004 *** -0.109 -0.005 *** -0.163
(-3.75) (-4.96)
Concurrent earnings forecasts 0.331 *** 8.814 0.310 *** 9.893
(38.11) (38.2)
Log (B/M) -0.028 *** -0.732 -0.004      -0.118
(-10.99) (-1.58)
Log (Size) -0.044 *** -1.159 -0.075 *** -2.398
(-10.69) (-19.71)
Price Momentum -0.004      -0.110 -0.003      -0.091
(-1.02) (-0.73)




Table V – Investment strategies 
 
(continued)  
Mthly avg Avg Ann Ann Ann Ann Ann Adjusted
Portfolio  # firms mkt cap mean std dev Skewness Kurtosis Sharpe ratio CEQ Turnover Coefficient estimates for the four factor model  R
2 Corrlong,short
($m) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel A: CRSP equally weighted index
10.73 21.17 -0.08 4.35 0.40 6.24 2.85 *    0.89 *** 0.67 *** 0.08 *   -0.22 *** 0.91
Panel B: Portfolio formed on the basis of naïve long-only strategy (1/N)
Long 1,279 5,175.43 7.39 19.27 -0.06 4.49 0.26 3.67 49.60 -0.71      0.88 *** 0.55 *** 0.21 *** -0.12 *** 0.88
Panel C: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis of changes in consensus recommendation
Long 879 6,584.25 6.53 19.67 0.00 4.50 0.22 2.66 49.05 -1.26      0.90 *** 0.51 *** 0.20 *** -0.14 *** 0.86
Short 69 4,584.85 5.63 21.46 0.49 5.69 0.16 1.03 46.96 -1.85      0.84 *** 0.48 *** 0.37 *** -0.30 *** 0.76
Long-Short 948 6,438.19 0.89 8.25 -1.35 7.59 -0.17 0.21 96.00 -1.69      0.07 *   0.03      -0.17 *** 0.16 *** 0.26 0.92
Panel D: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis of influential changes in consensus recommendation
Long 633 8,611.82 6.11 20.15 0.08 4.52 0.19 2.05 48.66 -1.33      0.93 *** 0.46 *** 0.19 *** -0.16 *** 0.85
Short 26 5,886.52 5.13 25.73 0.88 8.91 0.11 -1.49 44.07 -1.98      0.68 *** 0.75 *** 0.16      -0.48 *** 0.64
Long-Short 659 8,503.99 0.97 14.36 -1.67 16.51 -0.09 -1.09 92.73 -1.63      0.25 *** -0.29 *** 0.02      0.32 *** 0.19 0.83
Panel E: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis of changes in consensus recommendation change
Long 550 6,615.13 7.23 19.73 -0.04 4.45 0.25 3.34 49.42 -0.80      0.93 *** 0.50 *** 0.20 *** -0.09 *** 0.86
Short 338 6,826.13 4.81 20.37 0.20 4.78 0.12 0.66 48.70 -2.46      0.88 *** 0.50 *** 0.19 *** -0.24 *** 0.85
Long-Short 887 6,695.46 2.41 4.69 -0.61 5.52 0.03 2.19 98.12 -0.62      0.05 **  0.01      0.01      0.14 *** 0.34 0.97
Panel F: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis of influential changes in consensus recommendation change
Long 377 9,275.26 5.72 19.90 0.06 4.35 0.17 1.76 48.43 -1.49      0.96 *** 0.40 *** 0.14 *** -0.11 *** 0.84
Short 151 8,955.40 5.79 22.15 0.32 4.88 0.16 0.88 50.21 -1.44      0.91 *** 0.55 *** 0.15 **  -0.30 *** 0.85
Long-Short 528 9,183.60 -0.07 6.34 -0.04 7.50 -0.37 -0.47 98.64 -2.33 *    0.04      -0.15 *** -0.01      0.19 *** 0.38 0.96
Panel G: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis buying all recommendations (holding period 20 days)
Long 349 10,528.55 5.72 23.46 -0.73 4.47 0.15 0.21 236.25 -2.32      1.19 *** 0.43 *** 0.18 *** -0.14 *** 0.91
Short 257 9,623.48 -17.51 24.31 -0.87 5.17 -0.81 -23.42 243.51 -25.01 *** 1.15 *** 0.44 *** 0.13 **  -0.23 *** 0.87
Long-Short 607 10,144.43 17.24 25.55 1.14 5.77 0.59 10.71 479.76 20.20 *** -1.20 *** -0.44 *** -0.13 *   0.24 *** 0.85 0.97
Ann Intercept (%) Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD
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Table V – Continued 
This table reports the monthly average number of firms in a portfolio, the average market capitalization of the firms in each portfolio, annualized mean return (in percent), annualized 
standard deviation (in percent), skewness, kurtosis, annualized Sharpe ratio, annualized CEQ return (in percent, and annualized turnover of the Buy and Sell portfolios for the Naïve, 
Analyst Consensus, and Influential Analyst Consensus Strategies between 1999 and 2012. The certainty equivalent is computed using the power utility function with a risk aversion of 2. 
We estimate the four factor model using the Fama and French and Momentum factors. Corrlong,short is the correlation between the long and short portfolios for each strategy. *, **, *** 
denote the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Mthly avg Avg Ann Ann Ann Ann Ann Adjusted
Portfolio  # firms mkt cap mean std dev Skewness Kurtosis Sharpe ratio CEQ Turnover Coefficient estimates for the four factor model  R
2 Corrlong,short
($m) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel H: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis buying predicted influential recommendations (holding period 20 days)
Long 35 8,128.79 17.20 27.28 -0.29 3.90 0.55 9.76 195.55 8.27 *    1.13 *** 0.32 *** 0.58 *** -0.10      0.56
Short 38 6,716.31 -16.35 32.50 0.21 5.38 -0.57 -26.92 217.17 -24.41 *** 1.37 *** 0.41 *** 0.08      -0.12      0.59
Long-Short 72 7,392.95 34.86 26.79 1.60 10.79 1.22 27.68 412.72 31.15 *** -0.31 **  0.02      0.52 *** 0.04      0.09 0.67
Panel I: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the on the basis of TPER consensus change
Long 678 4,738.78 6.40 19.02 -0.01 5.03 0.22 2.78 45.30 5.39      0.18 *   -0.22 *   -0.16      0.03      0.01
Short 137 8,824.02 4.15 13.88 -0.32 11.05 0.13 2.22 15.87 2.07      0.18 **  -0.17 *   -0.05      0.13 **  0.03
Long-Short 816 5,426.19 0.68 2.36 0.62 10.92 -0.68 0.63 61.17 -1.49 **  -0.01      0.00      0.00      -0.02 *   0.00 0.71
Panel J: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis of TPER consensus change and changes in consensus recommendation
Long 201 4,811.06 10.87 22.33 -0.02 4.46 0.22 5.88 52.81 10.03 *    0.24 **  -0.24      -0.18      -0.01      0.02
Short 20 5,169.42 3.00 15.79 0.22 11.13 0.04 0.51 15.08 0.81      0.23 *** -0.21 *   -0.03      0.15 **  0.04
Long-Short 221 4,843.74 4.44 6.56 -1.26 15.75 0.33 4.01 67.88 2.37      -0.06      0.04      -0.05      -0.03      0.00 0.63
Panel K: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis of TPER consensus change and changes in consensus recommendation change
Long 244 4,104.85 13.22 21.32 0.00 4.58 0.51 8.67 54.13 11.91 **  0.28 **  -0.21      -0.15      0.00      0.03
Short 32 6,048.25 4.68 15.80 0.29 11.06 0.15 2.18 14.95 2.58      0.20 **  -0.20 *   -0.04      0.16 **  0.04
Long-Short 276 4,330.18 2.50 5.35 0.50 10.34 0.04 2.21 69.08 0.14      0.00      0.04      -0.01      -0.02      -0.01 0.63
Panel L: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis of TPER consensus change and influential changes in consensus recommendation
Long 150 7,919.70 10.33 22.59 0.23 4.40 0.36 5.23 49.32 9.70      0.21 *   -0.26 *   -0.18      -0.01      0.02
Short 5 8,320.77 2.28 19.12 2.84 24.00 0.00 -1.38 12.22 -0.09      0.21 **  -0.19      0.05      0.11      0.01
Long-Short 154 7,931.54 3.18 11.57 -2.48 25.51 0.08 1.85 61.54 1.01      -0.03      0.04      -0.07      -0.01      -0.02 0.52
Panel M: Equally weighted portfolios formed on the basis of TPER consensus change and influential changes in consensus recommendation change
Long 127 6,564.56 8.61 21.20 0.11 4.44 0.30 4.12 47.61 8.33      0.22 *   -0.31 **  -0.22      0.00      0.03
Short 9 7,991.90 7.47 19.82 2.25 22.65 0.26 3.54 15.74 6.49      0.19 *   -0.30 **  -0.17      0.15 *   0.03
Long-Short 136 6,658.42 -0.80 9.60 -4.18 41.53 -0.32 -1.72 63.35 -3.96      -0.01      0.10      0.10      -0.02      0.00 0.61
Ann Intercept (%) Rm-Rf SMB HML UMD
